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In his book The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, Laurence Bonjour criticizes 
advocates of externalist versions of foundationalism. According to Bonjour, 
"externalism reflects an inadequate appreciation of the problem at which it is 
aimed."l With this in mind, Bonjour sets out to argue that externalism is not an 
acceptable theory for the foundationalist to appeal to in his attempt to solve the 
regress problem. In order to avoid a complete stalemate over doctrine, Bonjour's at­
tempt to argue that externalism is unacceptable proceeds as an appeal to intuition. 
As such he allows that"although this intuition may not constitute a conclusive ob­
jection to the view, it is enough... to place the burden of proof squarely on the ex­
ternalist."2 Bonjour's criticism is aimed at the externalist conception of justification. 
I contend that Bonjour's demand of proof can be met by the externalist. Moreover, 
as I shall argue, the proper conception of justification involves the use of both 
internalist and externalist requirements. To establish my contention I shall draw the 
internalist/ externalist distinction with regard to justification and examine the 
intuitive strengths of each. Having completed these tasks we shall find that a proper 
epistemology incorporates a level distinction between non-epistemological claims 
on the first level and epistemological claims on the second level. Justification on the 
first level, I shall argue, warrants externalist requirements, while justification on the 
second level warrants internalist requirements. 
In the field of epistemology one can be said to possess knowledge only if certain 
requirements are met. Traditionally, these requirements have been the following, 
S is said to know p iff, 
1) P is the case 
2) S believes that p 
3) S's belief that p is adequately justified 
It has been one of the main tasks of the epistemologist to elucidate the third require­
ment. Just what is meant by "adequate justification?" Is it a requirement of the be­
liever, or of the belief? The externalist/ internalist debate is centered around these 
very questions. For the externalist, S's being able to justify the belief that p is 
inessential to SiS having knowledge. On the other hand, Bonjour, an internalist, in­
sists that S be able to justify his/her belief in order to have knowledge.3 The follow­
1BonJour, Laurence, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1985), p. 37. 
2BonJour, p. 37. 
3BonJour, p. 10. 
ing example illustrates the distinction between the conceptualization of justification 
on the part of the externalist and on the part of the internalist. 
Suppose that you and your friend are enrolled in a Survey of Asian Art class. 
Being the studious type you have paid attention in class, and kept up on assign­
ments. Throughout the course you have diligently studied the material and have a 
firm grasp of it. Your friend, on the other hand, has been altogether too occupied 
with the good looks of a fellow classmate and hasn't heard a word of lecture. 
Furthermore your friend hasn't even bought the books for the class, let alone 
cracked one open. The night before the first exam, and having finished reviewing, 
you check up on your friend's study. You find that your friend is extremely confused 
about the time periods of two seemingly identical urns. You repeatedly tell your 
friend, to no avail, which urn is from which century, failing to explain how it is you 
can discern the one from the other. As if things couldn't get worse for the poor 
chum, on the way to class the next day your friend trips and lands on a, unbeknown 
to anyone, magical rock. The spill leaves your friend with a nasty bump on the head. 
Now suppose just minutes before the exam is to be administered you finish taking a 
last glance at your notes and your friend takes a look at the sheet with the two urns 
on it. You ask your friend which urn is from which century and low and behold 
your friend is correct. After the exam you decide to see if your friend was a lucky 
guesser. You repeatedly question your friend and find that regardless of the order 
you present pictures of the urns your friend is consistently correct. What has hap­
pened, you see, is that the magical rock your friend landed on gave your friend a 
subconscious awareness of one minute distinguishing factor between the urns 
which now causes your friend to associate each urn with its correct century. When 
you both receive your graded exams, you find that both you and your friend received 
full credit on the urn question. Who has knowledge regarding this matter, you, your 
friend, both you and your friend, neither you nor your friend? 
By the externalist's lights both you and your friend know the fact regarding the 
urn's origin. According to the internalist however, only you have that knowledge. 
The externalist contends that because both you and your friend formed a true belief 
in a reliable fashion, (you through study, your friend through a never failing sub­
conscious mechanism) such that if the belief were not true neither one of you 
would hold it, both instances constitute knowledge. Unlike the externalist, the in­
ternalist looks to each of you for a reason justifying your holding your belief. 
Moreover, what the internalist is ultimately concerned with is an individual's cog­
nitive access to why it is that holding a belief is justified. In other words, the inter­
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nalist, beyond asking for your reasons for holding the belief that p, asks for reasons 
why these reasons are legitimate with regard to your right to think p is true. These 
reasons for your reasons are spoken of as metajustifiers, since they justify your 
justification for holding the belief that p. While you can account for your belief on 
the basis of your study and offer a reason for why studying is a legitimate reason for 
you to think your belief about the urns is true, your friend is at a complete loss to as­
sociate the magical with his/her correct answer and most certainly wouldn't be able 
to give a reason why the encounter with the magical rock ought to be considered a 
legitimate belief forming mechanism. As a result, the internalist holds that you 
have knowledge while your friend does not. 
Having laid out the views of the externalist and internalist regarding epistemic 
justification, we shall now examine Bonjour's contention that "externalism reflects 
an inadequate appreciation of the problem at which it is aimed."4 Perhaps Bonjour 
is motivated to make such a claim because of the historical perspective with which 
he approaches the subject matter. Bonjour traces the notion of epistemic 
justification to Descartes. Descartes, who adopted the approach of believing only that 
which could not possibly be doubted, according to Bonjour, motivated the modern 
epistemological tradition which "identifies epistemic justification with having a rea­
son, perhaps even a conclusive reason, for thinking that the belief is true."s This 
being the case, Bonjour contends that the externalist has made a break from the tra­
dition, and "rather than offering a competing account of the same concept of epis­
temic justification...has simply changed the subject."6 Has the externalist "simply 
changed the subject?" Given that he is not concerned with SIS ability to give reasons 
for her beliefs he most certainly has. The externalist does not consider the concept of 
justification as applying to S the believer, but rather to SIS belief, a radical change 
from tradition to be sure. Yet in changing the subject, has the externalist likewise 
failed to give an adequate appreciation of his subject? The answer to this as we shall 
see is "not entirely." Bonjour is simply mistaken in equating a change in approach 
with inadequacy of that approach. By labeling it "inadequate" because of its differ­
ences, Bonjour would have us dismiss the theory altogether. This would be a very 
hasty decision, however, because, though not entirely correct, externalism is valu­
able to the field of epistemology. Indeed, it will be demonstrated that by changing the 
subject, the externalist is able to account for several of our intuitions regarding be­
4BonJour, p. 37.
 
SBonJour, forthcoming.
 
6BonJour, forthcoming.
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lief. For this reason, we must consider what motivates the externalist to change the 
subject. Is he simply being ignorant or is there a motivation for his "madness?" 
When we consider a possible consequence of remaining within the tradition we find 
that the externalist has a legitimate motivation for making the type of move he 
does. 
By remaining within the tradition, the internalist must contend with the skep­
tic's criticism that internalism, when taken to its logical conclusion, results in our 
inability to know anything. Skepticism about S's ability to possess knowledge results 
as the internalist gets caught in an infinite regress about the justification of the Bp. 
The skeptic's reasoning is as follows. In an effort to make S accountable for the be­
liefs he holds, internalism requires that S provide reasons to think S's belief that p is 
true. Additionally, in order to substantiate S's reasoning, the internalist requires S to 
provide metajustificatory reasons for thinking his reasons that the belief that p is 
true are themselves truth conducive. The skeptic argues that, to remain consistent, 
the internalist must further require S to have a justification for his metajustification 
and so on ad infinitum. In other words, S should be required to have reasons to 
think that the reasons which justify the reasons to think the belief that p is true, are 
justified. If the regress is not stopped, notes the skeptic, then S's is obviously never 
justified in holding the belief that p and therefore never has knowledge. The only 
way to stop the regress, continues the skeptic, would be to appeal to an unjustified 
justifier.7 However, the internalist cannot appeal to an unjustified justifier without 
appearing arbitrary, and thus it seems unlikely that S's belief that p can ever be 
justified. If this is the case, how then, questions the skeptic, can S ever have knowl­
edge about the most empirical of matters, such as S's having a body? Because the ex­
ternalist is committed to the idea that we do in fact have some knowledge, external­
ism does not require reasons, let alone metajustificatory reasons, for why S believes 
p to be true. The skeptical argument against internalism can be viewed as providing 
a strong motivation for externalism. However, to view externalism merely as a re­
sponse to the skeptical problem would be to disregard, as we shall see, one of the 
strongest arguments in favor of externalism. Furthermore, even if the skeptic could 
be answered, internalism is still presented with the problem that anyone aside from 
epistemologists does not have knowledge. It is therefor one of the thrusts of this pa­
per to view externalism not merely as a response to the skeptical problem that in­
7 Foundationalism does offer unjustified justifiers when appealing to basic beliefs. However, as 
BonJour argues in chapter two of The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, (Massachusetts, Harvard 
University Press, 1985) there are several problems with an appeal to foundationalism. 
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ternalism faces, but rather as a theory with its own virtues. The following discussion 
will demonstrate the intuitive strengths of externalism. 
One demonstration of externalism's ability to account for our intuitions where 
internalism does not, involves its ability to discriminate between instances of vary­
ing epistemic value. Consider the following example: 
Arnie, Betty, Carla, Dean, Ernie, and Fay are walking around in Epistemic 
Gardens. When we come upon our flower lovers we find that all six hold the same 
belief concerning why it is the jaqueminot rose has no thorns, and it so happens that 
the belief is true. This, however, is where the similarities end. On the one hand, 
Arnie, Betty, and Carla's belief is formed by a reliable belief forming mechanism 
such that if the belief were not true, they would not hold it. Dean, Ernie, and Fay, 
on the other hand, just happen to hold the belief. In other words, their belief is "ac­
cidentally true." Listing the groups' epistemic possessions we have: 
Arnie, Betty, Carla (Group A) Dean, Ernie, Fay (Group B) 
Truth Truth 
Belief Belief 
Reliable Belief Forming No Reliable Belief 
Mechanism Forming Mechanism 
According to an internalist stand, Group A and Group B have equal epistemic sta­
tus. Yet, noting that the difference in the groups' epistemic possessions has to do 
with the reliability of the groups' beliefs, the externalist questions whether or not we 
would be selling Group A's belief short to equate their epistemic status with the 
epistemic status of Group B's belief. After some consideration, our answer should be 
yes, clearly, the epistemic status of Group A is higher than that of Group B. Think of 
it this way: knowing what you do about why they hold their belief, wouldn't you 
discount Fay's statement of her belief, yet have confidence in Betty's? The simple 
fact of the matter is that Fay has no good reason to believe p or not p, while Betty's 
belief has formed for what appears to be a good reason. Clearly we can conclude that 
there is a difference in epistemic status of the two groups for the nature of Group 
A's belief formation is substantial as compared to the nature of Group B's belief 
formation. By arguing that those in Group A have justified belief and hence, knowl­
edge, the externalist can account for the difference in the groups epistemic status. 
The internalist cannot. In fact, the most the internalist can say about the difference 
in epistemic status of the two groups is that members of Group A, though not of a 
different epistemic status than those in Group B, make better "belief thermometers." 
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Another demonstration of externalism's ability to account for our intuitions 
where internalism does not follows from the idea that the reliable belief forming 
mechanism does create a difference in epistemic status. The externalist contends 
that our intuition that there is a difference in epistemic status between the beliefs 
held by Group A and B is unaffected by the fact that neither Betty nor Fay would be 
able to explain their beliefs. This too appears in line with our intuitions. After all, 
our measure of confidence has to do with the fact that Betty's belief was formed by a 
mechanism that we trust, not with her ability to enunciate that mechanism. It is 
natural that we have no confidence in Fay's belief because we realize that she could 
have just as easily formed the exact opposite belief. Betty, on the other hand, because 
of her reliable belief forming mechanism, could only hold the true belief. In sum 
then, our intuitions are leading us to the following notion: group A is of a higher 
epistemic status than group B, regardless of group A's ability to account for why this 
is so. Once more, the externalist account of knowledge is in line with our intuitions. 
A final intuition that arises out of the Epistemic Gardens case, which demon­
strates externalism's ability to account for our intuitions where internalism does 
not, underlies our preceding intuitions. It is simply that the objective viewpoint has 
a function in the realm of epistemology. Both our intuitions that Group A is of 
higher epistemic status than Group B, and our intuition that the awareness of this 
status by Group A is irrelevant to that group possessing such a status rely upon our 
intuition that an objective viewpoint has relevance when speaking of others' epis­
temic status. Such an intuition, in line with externalist accounts of knowledge, is di­
rectly at odds with the internalist who denies the value of any viewpoint aside from 
S's when speaking of the justification of S's beliefs. 
In all fairness to BonJour we must reconsider his argument, for he contends that 
his view is in line with our intuitions. BonJour's criticism of the externalist posi­
tion is in line with our intuitions to a degree. Given instances in which individuals 
meet externalist conditions, BonJour questions whether or not these individuals are 
being epistemically irresponsible to hold their beliefs.8 As readers we reflect and 
conclude that it certainly would be a form of irresponsibility to claim knowledge 
merely on the basis of reliable belief formation, if one could not account for this 
mechanism as a reason for why his belief should constitute knowledge. If our 
friend from the Survey of Asian Art class were to claim that he/ she knew which 
urn is from which century, wouldn't you question your friend's logic? After all, 
8BonJour, p. 42. 
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your friend can't tell you how he/ she knows this. What are his/her reasons? "I just 
know I know," is all your friend can reply. The fact that you mayor may not know 
about the association between his/her head injury and his/her belief is of no help 
either (and chances are you wouldn't). And, even if you did know about the associ­
ation, that doesn't help your friend's ability to make a credible statement of knowl­
edge. The notion of "blind faith" or "gut feeling" that your friend is relying on is 
worthless when what we're looking for is the "cold hard facts." In this regard, exter­
nalism seems to be too weak, for it allows knowledge to be claimed too easily, al­
most as if it weren't "earned." BonJour relates these notions of one's "earning" the 
right to claim to know in terms of his notion of epistemic duty. BonJour contends 
that just as we have a moral duty to try to do the right thing to the best of our own 
reckoning, so too we have an epistemic duty to think the right thing.9 Clearly, it 
seems that our friend is shirking some kind of duty when he/ she starts making 
knowledge claims. 
Reviewing our externalist intuitions, we found that when S's belief p is formed 
by a reliable belief forming mechanism, S's belief is of a higher epistemic status than 
when the belief that p is accidentally true. This status remains the same regardless of 
S's ability to account for the mechanism as the cause of the belief. Rather, we noted 
that the mere fact that the mechanism caused the belief that p was all that mattered. 
However, given our internalist intuitions we seem to feel that an individual is ac­
countable for his or her ability to claim knowledge. The fact that S's belief was 
caused by a reliable belief forming mechanism was of no consequence to the inter­
nalist's determining whether or not S had knowledge, as S was neither aware of the 
mechanism nor of its reliability. 
I propose that we consider the matter in terms of a levels distinction which in­
corporates the difference between non-epistemological claims and epistemological 
claims. Second level claims are epistemological while all others are first level non­
epistemological claims. By recognizing this distinction, we can account for our 
seemingly contradictory intuitions in such a manner as to require that both exter­
nalist and internalist criteria be met. Ultimately, by making just this sort of move 
we will have a better understanding of the role of justification in epistemology. The 
difference between non-epistemological and epistemological claims is a distinction 
about the content of "p" regardless of whether we are speaking of believing p, or 
justifiably believing p or even knowing p. Non-epistemological claims have as their 
9BonJOUf, pp. 44-45. 
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content representations of states of the world. However, they are not about S's men­
tal states. Conversely, epistemological claims have as their content representations 
of S's mental states, more accurately S's knowledge states. For example, a non-epis­
temological claim would be "the sky is blue," while an epistemological claim would 
be "S knows that the sky is blue." 
Synthesizing externalist and internalist requirements is something new in epis­
temology, to say the least. One approach currently being developed involves what 
should properly be labeled the "bifurcation of knowledge."IO According to this the­
ory, an individual S has knowledge in one of two ways. Both require that p be true 
and that S hold the belief p. A final requirement is met when either S has adequate 
justification for her belief, where justification is understood to mean "reasons" to be­
lieve the belief is likely to be true, or S's belief has been formed by a reliable belief 
forming mechanism. Such a mechanism can be understood as a type of Humean 
"hard wiring"-an answer to why it is the way we think the way we do. These types 
of beliefs are foundational beliefs. They exist only as a small number of basic empiri­
cal beliefs. The theory which is internalist about justification, considers this second 
manner of obtaining knowledge as knowledge possessed without and not requiring 
justification. It is introduced to account for the belief that there are causes for the 
formation of beliefs which are not reasons but nevertheless do result in knowledge. 
Another approach involves a levels distinction that incorporates the use of in­
ternalist and externalist constraints. It is offered by William Alston in his work 
"Level Confusions in Epistemology. "11 What Alston proposes involves a distinction 
between the first level justification of the belief p which he claims to be internalist, 
and a second level metajustification of the belief that the belief p is justified which 
he claims to be externalist. What Alston is claiming is that S is justified in her belief 
that p if S can provide reasons for thinking that p is true. However, unlike the pure 
internalist who requires a metajustification from S in terms of reasons for thinking 
his reasons are justified, Alston allows metajustification to be external to S. The 
distinction in Alston's theory is at the metajustificatory level-where the internalist 
requires S to have a cognitive grasp of why her reasons are justified, Alston does 
not. He is thus externalist in this regard. 
101. W. Colter, in conversation. 
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What I propose is that the correct distinction to be made between internalism 
and externalism is unlike both of the above examples. It differs12 from the first view 
because that view allows for reliable belief forming mechanisms to account for only 
a severely limited number of cases in which one can be said to possess knowledge, 
and it is overall internalist; it differs from Alston's view in that the distinction 
between levels is made on a different basis than Alston's, Le., the levels distin­
guished are different, and the justification on the levels is reversed, Le. first level 
justification is externalist while second level justification is internalist. 
As mentioned earlier, central to my proposed levels distinction is the distinction 
between non-epistemological claims and epistemological claims. The distinction is 
noteworthy because of its great consequence to the discussion of justification in epis­
temology. In order to begin a discussion of justification that recognizes this distinc­
tion it is necessary to further elucidate the difference between what is meant by 
"non-epistemological" and what is meant by "epistemological". The following ex­
ample illustrates the difference: 
Suppose that Norman, a clairvoyant, comes to believe as a result of his clairvoy­
ance that the President is in New York13 (clairvoyance for purposes of this paper will 
constitute a reliable belief forming mechanism). Suppose, additionally, that 
Norman is unaware of his clairvoyance and in fact has no good reason, in his own 
estimation, to believe that the President is in New York. Still, he holds this belief 
just as firmly as you hold the belief that you are currently reading. What we shall 
discern from this example is the difference between two possible situations that 
might arise from Norman's predicament (one of which, we shall later see, is 
justified by the state of affairs that currently obtains, the other of which is not.) The 
following is true of both situations: it is true that the President is in New York, 
Norman holds the belief that the President is in New York, and Norman's belief is 
formed via a reliable belief forming mechanism. In the first situation Norman as­
serts "that the President is in New York" while in the second situation Norman as­
serts "that I know that the President is in New York." Norman's first assertion, 
"That the President is in New York," is a claim about the belief regarding the 
President's whereabouts and nothing more. It is therefore merely a non-epistemo­
logical claim. By contrast, Norman's second assertion, "I know the President is in 
12 It is not within the purpose of this essay to analyze other approaches to synthesizing externalist 
and internalist requirements. Colter's and Alston's views are mentioned for the sole purpose of 
distinguishing my theory from others. They serve only an explicative function. 
13BonJour, p. 41. 
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New York," is a claim about the President's whereabouts, and about Norman's be­
lief that the President is in New York. Herein lies the difference: the second of 
Norman's claims involves an epistemological claim. Not only does Norman hold 
the belief that the President is in New York, he also holds the belief that he knows 
that the President is in New York. The belief that he knows something is an episte­
mological claim. 
Having laid out the difference between non-epistemological and epistemological 
claims and beliefs, we must now examine the value of this difference to the notion 
of justification and the idea of a levels distinction. I will argue that a proper episte­
mology distinguishes at the first level externalist justification as associated with 
non-epistemological claims, while at the second level associating internalist 
justification with epistemological claims. 
Let us begin by examining justification on the first level. This level is distin­
guished by the fact that the beliefs formed by S are non-epistemological. They are of 
the sort that Group A held in the Epistemic Garden case and those held by 
Norman 14 in Situation 1. They do not involve S's believing that S knows some­
thing, merely that S believe something. What did we learn about this type of belief 
from our first example that can be applied to our second that will help us determine 
the sort of justification necessary at the first level? In the Epistemic Gardens case we 
held that Group A's belief was of a higher epistemic status than Group B's. What 
was it that motivated this conclusion? Given that the only difference between the 
groups was the possession of a reliable belief forming mechanism, we apparently 
identified the reliable belief forming mechanism as an indicator of higher epistemic 
status. This is of great importance, as the reliable belief forming mechanism which 
caused the belief is the exact sort of mechanism that the externalist identifies as a re­
quirement for knowledge. If we define knowledge as justified true belief we find that 
the reliable belief forming mechanism justifies the belief p at this level. We can con­
clude then that if one's non-epistemological beliefs are reliably formed, that indi­
vidual can be said to possess knowledge. An examination of our intuitions regard-
14Norman's two situations: 
Situation 1 Situation 2 
(non-epistemological claim) (epistemological claim) 
1.p 1.p 
2. belief p 2. belief p 
3. reliable belief forming 3. reliable belief forming 
mechanism for belief p mechanism for belief p 
4. beliefKp 
10
 
ing non-epistemological claims has shown us that meeting the externalist require­
ments of a reliable belief forming mechanism is sufficient to justify those claims. 
In .addition to offering an intuitive account of externalist justification as 
sufficient for non-epistemological claims, an examination of the inapplicability of 
"epistemological duty" to non-epistemological claims will show that an individual 
S need not be aware nor be in a position to become aware of the reasons that holding 
the non-epistemological belief p brings her closer to the truth, and yet still she can be 
said to possess knowledge of p. This is so because "epistemological duty" cannot be 
assigned to the realm of non-epistemological belief. If we examine an analogy be­
tween moral philosophy and epistemology we find that the notion of "duty" has no 
place when talking of an individuals believing p. Consider the following: 
Ethics 
Epistemology 
doing the right thing is analogous to having true beliefs 
doing what is by one's is analogous to subjective justification 
own lights is the right 
thing 
blindly but habitually is analogous to blindly but habitually and 
and discriminately discriminately believing the 
doing the right thing true thing 
What concerns us about the above analogy15 is the final comparison between ethics 
and epistemology. In ethics, while one who blindly but habitually and dis­
criminately does the right thing would be described as amorat her actions would be 
described as moral. Indeed the status of her actions as moral actions remains the 
same even if she could not become aware of the moral value of her actions. The ac­
tions have a moral character independent of the actor. Furthermore, it would seem 
ridiculous to hold that she ought not perform these moral actions unless she be­
comes aware of their moral value. However, it is important to realize that unless 
the performance of her actions becomes or could become a conscious endeavor, she 
could not claim herself to be a moral actor. By the same token, a person who blindly 
but habitually believes the true thing ought to be recognized as knowing p, yet be 
unable to claim herself to be a knower. 
15K. Possin, class lecture. 
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Let us now examine justification on the second level. Having examined 
Norman's first situation we found that he does in fact have knowledge of the presi­
dent's whereabouts. However, in the second situation we find that while he like­
wise has knowledge of the president's whereabouts; he does not have knowledge 
that he has such knowledge. His belief that he knows the president is in New York 
is only accidentally true. In order for Norman to be justified in making his second 
claim, both of the beliefs identified must meet the requirements of knowledge men­
tioned earlier. However, because we are now dealing with epistemological claims, 
the notion of non-accidentally true beliefs requires more than that the belief be 
formed in a reliable manner. If we recall our discussion of BonJour's notion of epis­
temic duty, we found that such a notion did appeal to our intuitions in a limited 
sense. Although, as I have argued, one cannot be said to have an epistemic duty re­
garding non-epistemological claims, it does seem that the notion of duty is applica­
ble to epistemological claims. An individual is not prohibited, by some duty, from 
continuing to believe nor from stating his non-epistemological beliefs; yet he cannot 
extend this privilege to an epistemological belief regarding his non-epistemological 
belief. Furthermore, if we recall our analogy to ethics, we can dig deeper into why it 
is that internalist conditions need be met at the second level. While we concluded 
that it would be ridiculous that our knower S not perform moral actions unless she 
becomes aware of their moral value, we also noted that unless the performance of 
her actions becomes or could become a conscious endeavor, she could not claim 
herself a moral actor. Likewise, while we concluded that a person who blindly but 
habitually believes the true thing ought to be recognized as possessing knowledge, 
that same person ought not be able to claim herself a knower. 
Thus far, I have sought to motivate our internalist and externalist intuitions and 
through an analogy to ethics I have associated internalist intuitions with epistemo­
logical claims and externalist intuitions with non-epistemological claims. 
Additionally, I have proposed that these intuitions ought to be understood as in­
dicative of a levels distinction in epistemology unlike any previously proposed. At 
this point, my account of justification in epistemology is incomplete as I have yet to 
answer why it is that one ought to associate externalist requirements with the first 
level and internalist requirements with the second level. 
Examining the second level first, we find that externalism is simply an improper 
theory to be applied to epistemological claims. The reliable belief forming mecha­
nism which constitutes justification for the externalist does not function when it 
comes to our knowledge states. Consider what it is to have a belief formed in a reli­
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able fashion. Your belief that there are characters on the page before you, for in­
stance, involves a causal relation between the empirical world and your thought 
processes. It is the absence of this causal relation in the formation of epistemological 
claims that prevents reliabilism from being an applicable justifier. Furthermore, 
knowledge claims are the sorts of things we, as cognitive beings, must handle re­
sponsibly. Making a knowledge claim without having reasons to think you can is ir­
responsible. In claiming to know something one asserts a position in relation to the 
empirical world that is privileged. We ought not claim that privilege without rea­
sons. In sum, at the second level externalism is not a recourse, and internalism is 
warranted. This being the case we can conclude that we ought to make internalist 
requirements at the second level of epistemological claims. 
Before moving on to the first level of justification, consider the following case 
which will help illustrate the logic behind drawing the levels distinction in the 
manner I am arguing. You recently had the good fortune of being invited to your 
dear friend's home to share in her family's Christmas dinner. You accept the invita­
tion and arrive at your friend's home early morning December 25. When you enter 
her house you immediately smell a variety of mouth-watering odors. Taking a deep 
breath, you exclaim to your friend that you can't wait to have a taste of that delicious 
plum pudding her family is preparing. At this point we must ask ourselves "How is 
it that your formed this belief given that your friend hasn't mentioned a word of 
what the meal shall consist?" In answer, we explain your belief that the meal will 
include plum pudding on the basis of your smelling what you perceive to be plum 
pudding. We do not explain your statement on the basis of your going through the 
following sort of cognitive process, upon smelling the belief you a) noted your olfac­
tory senses were stimulated, b) you smelt the odor, c) you considered whether or not 
smelling was a good indicator of the truth of odors, d) on the basis of a - c, formed 
the belief that you smelt plum pudding and based your statement on that belief. The 
only time these thought processes would occur would be if you claimed to know 
that plum pudding was being prepared. This thought process then becomes what is 
referenced when you are asked for reasons why it is you think you know p. In draw­
ing the levels distinction in the manner I have argued for, we can account for our 
basing beliefs on perception, and yet hold individuals accountable for asserting that 
that they know their perceptions are true. 
Shifting our attention to the first level of external justification we observe that 
the requirements of externalism are less stringent than those of internalism. Non­
epistemological beliefs are of a lower order than epistemological beliefs in that they 
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do not require the same degree of responsibility from S as epistemological beliefs do. 
S need only hold the belief that p with a degree of conviction (resulting from the fact 
that the belief was reliably formed) to be in a position to make non-epistemological 
claims. S ought not be held accountable for her non-epistemological beliefs and in 
fact, we do not hold S accountable. Consider again, the mechanism for how it is we 
come to have non-epistemological beliefs. When we perceive empirical objects we 
form beliefs about them, not as a result of some cognitive process involving our 
reasons for thinking what we perceive is actual; rather, a causal relation exists be­
tween ourselves and the world which results in our forming the belief that p. Our 
sense perception transduces data and beliefs are formed. The notion of accountabil­
ity for non-epistemological beliefs is a contrived requirement of internalism which 
is simply inappropriate. When we require more of S in forming his non-epistemo­
logical beliefs, as the internalist does, other than that they be formed reliably, then S 
just by satisfying externalist requirements does not have knowledge about the em­
pirical world. Were we to insist on internalist requirements for justification only 
epistemologists acquainted with internalist theory would have knowledge, as only 
they would be in a position to offer metajustificatory reasons for their belief that p, 
ordinary individuals would not. Surely, having knowledge is not the privilege of 
these students of epistemology alone. 
In sum, externalist justification is warranted on the first level of empirical claims 
due to the very nature of how it is we form such claims. To apply internalist re­
quirements at this level, would force us to the absurd conclusion that we do not 
have knowledge of the empirical world. 
Before concluding, it deserves mentioning that the levels distinction as I have 
drawn it is subject to the same skeptical objection on the second level regarding S's 
ability to know that S knows, that the internalist is subject to regarding S's ability to 
know that p. What, then, is the virtue of a levels distinction which requires that ex­
ternalist requirements be met for the justification of non-epistemological claims and 
internalist requirements be met for the justification of epistemological claims? The 
virtue of this distinction lie in the fact that ordinary individuals can be said to pos­
sess knowledge. This conclusion is to be favored over the internalist theory which 
concludes that ordinary individuals do not have knowledge, and over the skeptical 
conclusion that no individuals have knowledge. Furthermore, to argue that S has 
knowledge, though S may be unwarranted in claiming S has knowledge, is not "cold 
comfort." It matters, for instance that Norman knows that the President is in New 
York even if he can't claim he knows. How is this so? Norman's non-epistemologi­
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cal claim, in light of my levels distinction, is justified, whereas by the internalist's 
lights it is not. Similarly, your claim that there is a piece of paper before you (based 
on your perception), in light of my levels distinction, is justified, whereas by the in­
ternal lights it is not. In finding your's and Norman's non-epistemological claims 
unjustified, the internalist puts them on a par with the non-epistemological claim 
that there are twenty purple dancing elephants in front of you. Certainly, there is a 
difference between your empirical claim that there is a piece of paper in front of you 
and the empirical claim that there are twenty purple dancing elephants in front of 
you. The virtue of my theory is that the difference between the two non-epistemo­
logical claims mentioned above has been explained. 
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